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Throughout its history military 
communications went a long and complicated 
path of development: from simple sound and 
visual means for transmitting signals and 
command of execution to the battlefield to 
modern multifunctional automated systems, 
capable of providing almost unlimited in range 
communication for both immobile and moving 
land-based, afloat, under water, air and space 
objects.
The variety of communication means such 
as voice face to face communication, signaling 
system and courier communication appeared 
concurrently with the origin of human society. 
Initially it had peaceful application only. Usage 
of communication in military arts began in times 
of tribal wars with the subsequent using in the 
slaveholding society wars.
The appearanceas a result of social and 
military reform of the Athenian army in ancient 
Greece at the turn of VI – V centuries BC, The 
Great Wall of Chinese construction in IV – III 
centuries BC, where outpost support and fortress 
garrisons used smoke and flash signals to provide 
communication, creation in 312 BC of Rome – 
Brundizy and Rome – Ancona – Arimini in 220 
BC mail routes to communicate with troops on 
the march and on the battlefield, usage of pigeons, 
walkers, outrunners and variety of means 
of reports, messages and orders encryption 
as usage of variety of other communication 
means evidently represent slow, but the greatest 
possible for that time, development of military 
communication as to the most demanded as it 
provided safety of the state and success in both 
defensive, and aggressive wars.
With the formation of Eastern-Slavic tribes 
the rise of original Russian military art started 
which has received development in victorious 
wars with Byzantium in VI – VII centuries [1, 
p. 7]. Nevertheless, in spite of the occurrence of the 
first organizational and tactical forms of the battle 
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and new ways of troops control – communication 
facilities used for military purposes, were, as 
a matter of fact, the same as they were a lot of 
centuries back, maybe, only with the differences 
considering features of district and climate.
The most ancient Russian annals which have 
reached up to now and the images concerning 
the time of Kievan Rus (IX – XII centuries) 
testify to an independent way of development of 
a communication facility and the signal system, 
providing troops control [2, p. 5 – 11].
Transfering of military and state messages for 
a broad spectrum of the population of cities was 
carried out, as a rule, through special persons – 
«Biriuchi» (heralds). To apply the population 
to gathering armies the cymbal, bell, drums 
and pipes were used. On greater distances (for 
communication of boundary cities (fortresses) and 
the watchtowers with Kiev, and also with an army 
which is being a campaign) first of all fires and 
marks were used. They enabled the transferring of 
prearranged signals consistently from one post to 
another, forming a line of alarm communication 
along the border and the interior of the state. 
For the first time the «povoz» was applied (the 
kind of horse post), which provided delivery of 
princely decrees and military messages. For 
communication with an army and between 
posts along the border pigeons, messengers on 
skis, horses and on boats were widely used also. 
Delivery of especially important messages and 
their preservation were as fiduciary carried out 
especially by authorized representatives, thus the 
maintenance of a message either was learnt, or 
various ways of coding were applied. Directly on 
the battlefield the following methods of command 
were widely used: the personal contact, a personal 
example of the commander and his clothes, 
banners, the dismount warrior, arrows, pipes 
and its variations, a voice, position of hands and 
subjects (the weapon of the commander) were 
widely applied.[3. V. 1, p. 47 – 51].
In wars of Russian people against German dog-
knights (1240-1242) development of the military 
communications was expressed in expansion of 
a scope of mobile means. Horse and dismount 
warrior began to be used for communication of 
the commander with subordinates directly on a 
battlefield that facilitated troops control at the 
changed ways of the armed struggle.
During the struggle against the Tartar 
Mongol hordes in Russia (XIII-XIV centuries) 
for the first time in the history of military art 
communication on a campaign was provided 
by specially organized line of military «flying» 
riding mail. Reports from armies to grand prince 
Dmitry Donskoy or voevodes (battlemasters) 
were delivered not directly, but through a 
number of already established intermediate 
posts that provided greater speed of delivery of 
reports [4, p. 9].
The history of the Signal Corps originates 
since the time of creation of the regular Russian 
army and navy by progressive state and military 
figure Peter I. Having created regiments, brigades 
and divisions in army and squadrons, and naval 
divisions and groups, Peter I understood the 
importance of the organization of management 
of these structures in a peacetime and during 
operations, paying considerable attention to a 
question of use of a communications means.
For the first time in the book «Kniga Ustav 
Voinskiy» (Military Regulations), published on 
April, 12th, 1716, questions of troops control 
and communication were addressed in special 
chapters which defined and legislatively fixed 
the list of officials in the field of communication, 
their quantity and functional duties. The day of 
signing this regulations by Peter I is considered 
the day of the organization in the Russian Army 
of regular postal and courier communication 
service which given a start to the process 
of creation and development of military 
communications in Russia [5, p. 6]. From 
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that time army commanders and subordinate 
commanders were given aide-de-camps who 
delivered written orders and transferred oral 
instructions, and watched their execution also. 
For the maintenance of communications on 
the battlefield each commander wielded two 
drummers and no fewer than three messengers.
Consequentially, in analysis of operations of 
the last fights and wars as a whole experience of the 
organization of troops control with the purpose of 
its account was generalized by the development 
of some battle documents. For example, by the 
development in 1763 of the new Infantry charter 
and the charter for cavalry alongside other 
questions of action of infantry the organization 
of communications on the march, alignment of 
forces and their forming-up was also considered 
in detail. [6, p. 157].
In A.V.Suvorov’s campaigns who 
raised Russian military art to a higher level 
of development, troop control and military 
communications received the further development 
having outstripped the military art of the Western 
Europe. A.V.Suvorov practiced the allotment of 
staff officers to columns on the march, achieved 
the organization of steady communication on the 
front, and in necessary cases for maintenance of 
interaction used groups of cossacks which had 
in advance developed tactical abilities to appear 
suddenly or disappear, pass through fighting 
orders of the enemy, passing difficult sites and 
establishing communication. The commander 
showed samples of skilful application of a 
communication means depending on their battle 
characteristics (a rocket, alarm means), for the 
first time has applied a communication facility 
(rocket) for disinformation of the enemy, showed 
care of providing of couriers with all necessary 
for the performance of their duties.
For the fastest transfer of the instructions 
and orders to armies, and also duly situation data 
acquisition A.V.Suvorov’s first of all applied and 
used staff meetings (advice) of generals and head 
commander. [7, V. 1, p. 150, 158 – 159].
In 1778 the first special signal unit-Yamskoy 
Cossack regiment, and in 1796 – courier service 
corps were formed [8, V. 8, p. 266].
On the eve of the Patriotic War of 1812 
Russian military thinking in the field of troop 
control and communications went its own way, 
relying on the experience of the last wars and 
reached the level of development of productive 
forces. In January, 1812 the charter « Big army 
field forces control Establishment» was put 
into operation where functions of the second 
department and the on duty general in charge 
of communication matters were described. 
Field post offices were put in force in armies. 
Duties of messengers, orderlies, aide-de-camps, 
couriers were fixed. The special form and signs 
for the communication maintenance personal 
were fixed. The responsibility for a condition of 
military roads, placement of postal unit on them, 
providing of units with a delivering means, 
security and recruitment was established. Time 
of departures and deliveries of packages was 
fixed. The post «the military adviser and the 
field inspector of mails» was founded.
During the Patriotic War the theory developed 
by M.I.Kutuzov and practice of troops control, 
precisely defined service of aide-de-camps, 
orderlies, messengers, couriers and military post, 
have facilitated work of staffs and commanders. 
Nevertheless an applied communication facility 
lagged behind the requirements of troops 
control that is why army officers, inventors and 
constructors began to search for an output in the 
creation of technical communications.
After the Patriotic War of 1812 development 
of a communication facility went mainly in a 
direction of creation of such samples which would 
allow not only to submit prearranged message, 
but also to conduct the transfer of information, 
carrying out two-way exchange.
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Though officials of the imperial 
government, admiring everything foreign, did 
not encourage the domestic inventors, many 
Russian innovators worked at the improvement 
of a communication facility and have achieved 
in this respect great successes. And still, in 
spite of available domestic inventions: night 
optical telegraph of land surveyor Ponjuhaev 
in 1815; optical telegraphs of Russian inventor 
Shegorin in 1818 and Captain-Lieutenant 
P.E.Chistyakov in 1827 [9. d. 404а. p. 434]; 
semaphore telegraph of Major-General 
P.A.Kozen in 1824, – the imperial government 
for a huge sum of money bought the patent for 
the system of optical telegraph of the French 
engineer Z.Shato, represented advanced design 
of telegraph I.P Kulibin in 1833, invented in 
1793 [10. V.1, p. 93].
The optical telegraph existed in Russia 
for about half a century. From 1852 it began to 
be replaced by the electric telegraph. It was 
promoted by the discovery by Russian scientists 
and inventors in the field of electrotechnics and 
electromagnetism.
The first electromagnetic telegraph was 
invented in Russia in 1832 by Pavel Lvovich 
Shilling, the outstanding Russian physicist and 
the orientalist, therefore the priority of its creation 
belongs to Russia.
The worthy successor and continuer of 
P.L. Shilling works on the development and 
introduction of telegraph in Russia was Boris 
Semenovich Jakobi, an outstanding physicist and 
electrical engineer, a member of the Petersburg 
academy of sciences who in 1841 for the first time 
in Russia constructed a line of electric telegraph 
between the Winter Palace and the General Staff 
in Petersburg. Communication was carried out by 
means of original writing devices which design 
was better and more simple, than at invented 
in the same time in the Western Europe Morse 
device [11, p. 27-38].
Qualitatively a new period of development 
of Signal Corps began in the second half of 
the XIX century with the introduction in the 
Russian army of telecommunication means. 
Having estimated the advantage of electric 
telegraph in transferring of reports, orders, 
instructions on great distances in small terms 
that was important owing to the changed ways 
of conducting the armed struggle on extensive 
and isolated from each other battlefields, the 
Russian Military Engineers department of the 
Russia Ministry of War in April 1854 ordered 
a station of the military-marching electric 
telegraph consisting of two Morse cable devices 
and 16.5 versts of copper wire and poles in 
Vienna. In a year the military electric telegraph 
was applied in conditions of warfighting in 
Sevastopol during the Crimean War. Thus it is 
necessary to note, that by 1855 in Russia more 
than 5 thousand km of constant cable lines had 
been already constructed.
By 1864 the Sveaborgskiy fortress military 
telegraph has been formed, and in 1865 the 
fortress military telegraph in Kronstadt. Fortress 
telegraphs were regular parts of Signal Corps 
whose experience was used in the further 
formations [12, p. 9 – 13]. So, in 1867 the first 
exemplary military-marching cable park was 
completed which incorporated 4 officers and 40 
enlisted man, 8 Morse devices and 35 versts of 
wire. In three years the decision of forming six 
more military-marching parks was accepted. 
Subsequently, the manning level and material of 
parks were increased.
Field cable communication was 
successfully used during Russian-Turkish 
war in 1877 – 1878. The generalization of 
gained experience led to the reorganization of 
existing parks in 1883 and the forming of 17 
new marching military-cable parks at the rate 
of one park to each corps. Parks have received 
new manning table and equipment lists, their 
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communication facilities became more various; 
a new optical communication facility has 
appeared – heliographs and lanterns.
Wide application of military telegraph in the 
army has played an exclusively important role 
in the radical improvement of troops control. It 
has not only expanded opportunities for orders 
and reports transferring on great distances 
in short terms, but also provided document 
communication. But the telegraph did not allow 
carrying out personal discussions of commanders 
and staffs directly from the workplaces. The 
scientific idea aspired to solve this problem. 
In 1876 the American A.Bell and almost 
simultaneously with him, his compatriot E.Grey 
submitted patent applications for phones invented 
by them. Already by the end of 1877 telephone 
sets had appeared in Russia.
Many engineers and commanders of the 
Russian army have highly valued the importance 
of this invention for military communications. 
In the summer of 1878 in Vyborg under the 
direction of Lieutenant Colonel V.B.Jakobi the 
first tests of phones in the Russian army were 
carried out. Communication between islands 
of the Tranzundskiy sea gate at a distance of 6 
km by telegraph cable and between Vyborg and 
Uran-Saadskaya the governmental station on 
a line of military telegraph at a distance of 30 
km was carried out. The results of tests seemed 
positive. However the awkwardness and great 
weight of the first telephone sets did not allow for 
their use in the army. Soon V.B.Jakobi designed 
a miniature phone – the first field telephone set 
[13, p. 27 – 31].
The difficulty of using the phone firstly 
consisted of the necessity to have for this 
purpose special wires. Only after the decision 
by Captain G.G.Ignatyev in 1880-1881 a problem 
of simultaneous telegraphy and telephony by 
wires, did the phone start to be widely used in 
the Russian army [14, p. 10]. The initiator of the 
use of phones in the navy fleet was naval officer 
E.V.Kolbasev.
In 1894 the decision on the disbandment of 
existing cable parks was accepted. Instead of them 
for communication between staffs of army, corps 
and divisions in the structure of every army corps 
engineer battalion one telegraph company was 
formed. It consisted of 310 men and incorporated 
24 field telephone sets, 189 horses and 74 vehicles 
[15 p, 161 – 162].
Formation of telegraph companies in 
engineer battalions subordinated in the operative 
attitude to the chief of staff of the corps, and 
concerning completing the staff by specialists, 
communication materials and a special transport – 
to the Chief of the Army Engineers Department, 
was a great achievement in the development 
of a problem of centralization of military 
communications control in the Russian Army.
In the process of developing a means 
of fighting and military art, requirements to 
management of armies were continuously raised. 
An existing electric communication facility could 
not completely satisfy the need for management 
any more. On doctrines in peacetime and in 
fighting conditions often it was necessary to 
provide communication in conditions when it 
is difficult, and sometimes impossible to build 
wire lines (for example, in areas occupied by the 
opponent, greater water barrier or impassable 
mountains, with the ships in the sea and in a 
number of other cases). Life persistently demanded 
the creation of such means which could overcome 
the listed obstacles. In searches of the decision of 
a problem many minds in the 1880s and 1890s 
were occupied with the idea of how to signal at 
distance without wires.
Due to the progressive activity of Russian 
scientists and inventors, achievements in 
electrotechnics and technology of wire telegraph 
on April, 25th, 1895 at a session of the branch 
of physics of the Russian Society of Physics 
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and Chemistry the Russian scientist Alexander 
Stepanovich Popov made the scientific report on 
the invention of the communication system [16, 
p. 7 – 10].
In the spring of 1897 А.S.Popov had led a 
series of practical works on the realization of radio 
communication (wireless telegraph) between 
military fleet vessels, and in 1898 – 1900 under 
his control military signalmen made two portable 
radio stations and experiments were conducted 
on their use. 
It would seem, it was possible to provide 
the army with the necessary quantity of Russian 
radio stations, however the absence of the 
industrial base, a necessary commercial crop in 
the domestic industry of that time, absence of 
necessary enterprise led to the first samples of 
Popov’s spark radio station and it was decided to 
order abroad – to French firm «Dukrete».
In May of 1899 the first in the history of 
Russian military fleet radio unit – the Kronstadt 
spark military telegraph was formed. And in 1900 
after edition of a special Navy Department order 
which determined the introducing of wireless 
telegraph, russian military ships radio stations 
had started to be established [17, p. 161 – 162].
By the beginning of the Russo-Japanese war 
of 1904 -1905 there were still no independent Signal 
Corps in the Russian Army, telegraph companies 
were still a part of engineer battalions. However 
their organic means could not satisfy growing 
needs for telegraph and telephone messages any 
more. Also an absence of signal elements and 
units in troops complicated the organization of 
communication in conducting operations at all. 
And only during the war, with great delay, for the 
use of the General Headquarters and staffs the 
1st and 2nd Eastern-Siberian telegraph battalions 
had been formed. These battalions arrived at the 
theater of operation in September, 1904 and in 
June, 1905. Each battalion consisted of 26 officers 
and 1078 personnel.
In April 1905, for the first time two wireless 
telegraph (radiotelegraph) companies were 
formed for Army use. They used 8 radio stations, 
bought at the firm “Marconi”. Only one radio 
station served the officer and 45 personnel (24 of 
them were from logistics staff) [18, p. 12 – 13].
The Russo-Japanese war had shown the 
perspectives of technological application-
telegraph, phone and radio – for operative 
control of formations and units [7, V. 1, p. 274]. 
In terms of the variety of signals equipment, 
the Russian Army was not interior to any other, 
but the economic backwardness of Russia and 
weakness of technical base had not allowed it to 
have the necessary quantity of communications 
facilities.
Nevertheless, conclusions were drawn on 
the basis of war experience about the necessity 
of improving the organization of military 
communications. From 1910 the infantry corps 
communication units (21 operators, 13 horse 
messenger, 4 bicyclists, 10 versts of cable on 
coils) had been formed, and the total number of 
telegraph companies in the structure of engineer 
battalions of the Engineering Corps had reached 
35. Additionally there were 8 spark companies. 
Five of these companies during mobilization were 
deployable as two independent companies [19, p. 
7]. The recruiting of these units required plenty 
of experts in communication. Their training was 
carried out in both military schools, and directly 
in armies.
Training of signal officers for the Army in 
peacetime was carried out in Petrograd Military 
Engineering School, the only such school in 
Russia, and perfection of knowledge of officers 
was made at the biennial Officer Electrotechnical 
School created in 1911 on the basis of the Military 
Electrotechnical School, for teaching in which 
a number of authoritative scientists, such as 
B.S.Jakobi, P.N.Jablochkov and А.С. Popov were 
involved.
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The great lack of development of military 
communications before the First World War in 
the Russian Army was due to the absence of a 
single headquarters to control signal elements 
and units and also questions as to the organization 
and development of communications facilities. 
Still there were no independent Signal Corps. 
The communications service in the army was 
assigned to the general staff departments. 
There were no regular officials responsible 
for communication.
And still during the First World War real steps 
on uniting a radio communication control were 
carried out – in 1915 radiotelegraph managers of 
the fronts and armies were appointed and instead 
of spark companies radiotelegraphic battalions 
(at the end of war there were 16) were formed. 
In each corps and division a radiotelegraphic 
section was organized. By the end of 1916 there 
were 45 separate cable companies and 79 cable 
companies of engineer battalions in armies. 
Besides telegraph-cable sections were formed as 
part of division’s engineer companies. It became 
possible due to the creation during the war of a 
necessary industrial base for the manufacture of 
a domestic communication facility. So, in 1916, 
105 thousand telephone and 3 thousand telegraph 
devices, 236 thousand versts of cable, 800 radio 
stations and 10 thousand carts were supplied to 
the army [20, p. 1210, Л. 3, 48, 52].
For the preparation of signalmen in 
September – October, 1916 in all armies field 
educational telephone commands were formed, 
and from that time every front radiotelegraph 
manager had charge of a radio engineer school. 
Preparation of signalmen (private soldiers and 
corporals) was assigned to three reserve cable 
battalions and cable companies of engineer 
battalions. In 1915 for the purpose of officers 
preparation the Military Engineering School in 
Kiev was founded, and in 1916 at all headquarters 
of armies and fronts short-term (monthly and 
three-monthly) telegraph-telephone officer 
courses were organized [4, p. 34].
The quantitative growth of communications 
facilities and variety and complexity of their 
use urgently demanded centralization in the 
organization of a communication service in the 
Army as a whole. But by the end of the War it 
was not done in full measure. Only in May, 1917 
the post of chief signal officer in all headquarters 
from the General Headquarters to the regiments 
inclusive (in the regiment this post was occupied 
the signal team chief) was created. However the 
problem of organization of one centralized army 
signal service and separation of signal units and 
elements in special signal troops was not solved.
The First World War experience showed that 
operations where commanders paid close attention 
to the questions of troop control and organization 
of communication, as a rule, troops always 
achieved success (the operation of Southwest 
front, the 8th Army, etc.). On the contrary, the 
slighting attitude to questions of troop control 
and organization of communication led to defeat 
(destruction of the 2nd army of General Samsonov 
in the East-Prussian operation). This experience 
has implications for today.
After the October Revolution, in the 
conditions of the beginning of Civil War and 
military intervention, for the purpose of Soviet 
authority protection the formation of the first 
parts of the Red Army began. At the beginning 
of 1918 numerous measures on the creation of the 
control system of the Army were implemented 
[18 p, 17 – 18]. So, by the order of The People’s 
Commissariat of Military and Naval Affairs of 
April, 20th, 1918 №294 the first in Red Army 
the rifle division manning document was fixed. 
It made provision for having in a division a 
separate signal battalion of 977 personnel, and in 
regiments- signal teams.
The battalion commander simultaneously 
was charged with division signal affairs, and the 
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regiments signal team commander was charged 
with regimental signal affairs. But to form signal 
battalions appeared impossible as there were 
neither personnel, nor techniques and transport. 
Therefore in November, 1918 new manning 
document of rifle division signal battalion, rifle 
brigade signal company and rifle regiment signal 
team were fixed. By these manning documents 
the signal battalion of a division and a signal team 
of rifle regiment had much fewer communications 
facilities and less personnel and transport [21. 
Д. 43. Л. 59]. In December of that year signal 
elements had begun to be created in Aviation and 
the Cavalry.
Thus, from the very foundation of the Red 
Army signal battalions and signal teams did not 
consist any more in staffs of engineer units and 
elements. However a central body had not been 
created that could control the communications of 
the whole Red Army.
Since October, 1918 the field army radio 
communication control was carried out by the 
radiotelegraph inspector who was operationally 
subordinate to the Military Revolutionary 
Council headquarters, and in technical matters – 
to the chief of the General Military Engineering 
Command. At the fronts the post of the inspector of 
front radiotelegraph was created, and in armies – 
the post of army radiotelegraph manager was 
fixed. In front Headquarters the postal telegraph 
departments of people’s mails and telegraph 
commissariat (they provided a mail service and 
communication on constant communication lines) 
were created. The General Military-Engineering 
Command provided the Red Army with signal 
supplies.
By order of the Military Revolutionary 
Council Revvoyensoviet, Revolyutsionny 
Voyenny Sovyet) № 1736/362, on 20th of October 
1919, the Communications Office of the Red Army 
(RKKA) was formed. It was headed by the chief 
of the Red Army. Besides, the Departments of 
communications of fronts and armies, divisional 
and brigade departments of communications were 
formed [22, 72]. Thus, there was the formalization 
of association leadership coupling of the Red Army 
into a harmonious system. That day became the 
birthday of the Signal Corps of the Armed Forces, 
as a separate specialized corps. 
The Communication Office of the Red Army 
was responsible for the organization and providing 
of communications for the republic MRC and 
Field Head Quarters, fronts and armies of the Red 
Army, establishing of communication units, its 
training and equipment [21, D. 2. L. 7.]. The first 
Chief of Communications of the Red Army was 
A.M. Ljubovich (formerly the Commissar of Post 
Offices and Telegraphs); from September 1920 to 
April 1924 it was I.A. Khalepsky (formerly the 
chief of the Caucasus Front), who had done a lot 
for the establishment and development of Signal 
Corps.
By the end of 1920, Signal Corps included 
13 separate battalions and 46 battalions, 
communication divisions and brigades, a large 
number of companies and commands, warehouses, 
workshops and other units. The total strength of 
signal troops was more than a hundred thousand 
people [23, V. 2, p. 54].
During the civil war the general organization 
of communication at all levels of command of the 
Red Army had been developed, the main duties 
of communications officers were worked out, 
new ways of communicating by various means 
and devices were developed. Continuously the 
organizational and staff structure of linear and 
nodal units of communication were improved. 
It was the first time in the history of military 
communications, when the Red Army trains 
were used for communication and control. So it 
became easier for the commanders and HQ staffs 
at all levels to conduct control functions.
The activity of The Army Signal Corps 
during the Civil War was commended in a special 
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order of the Revolutionary Military Council of 17 
February 1921, which stated: “The heroic Red 
Army, which covered itself with undying glory, 
owes much to the signal troops, who carried out 
during the long struggle with the enemies of great 
responsible tasks “[24, D. 13. L, 31].
After the Civil War the corps had been 
reduced to 32,600 people and was armed with 
worn-out communications mostly of foreign 
production.
However, despite the low strength 
and the necessary involvement of soldiers 
for the reconstruction of civilian lines and 
communications centers, as well as other facilities, 
the Signal Corps was improving its structure, 
equipment and training of personnel. The actual 
issue of improving military communication 
came into existence because of the diversity of 
communications equipment and devices and their 
deterioration.
By order of the Revolutionary Military 
Council on 6 June 1920 the Military Technical 
Council of Communications (MTCC) – VTSS 
RKKA)), headed by the Red Army’s chief of 
communications was established, which was 
assigned to find solutions to all major issues 
of organization and development of military 
communication, including leadership in research 
and development of new technical means and 
current urgent issues.
However, very soon it became obvious that 
in the difficult conditions of transition period of 
the Red Army from war to peacetime in 1921 – 
1923 MTCC was necessary to remove a number 
of previously defined functions, and partially 
transmit them to any agency, which was capable of 
engaging in the development and implementation 
of research and technical policy in the field of 
military communications.
As a result of the urgent efforts of the Red 
Army’s chief of communications I.A. Khalepsky 
by order of the Revolutionary Military Council 
of the Republic on April 15, 1923 The Research 
Institute for the MTCC was established [25, S. 2 
-7]. Based on the outcome of the research institutes, 
during the prewar period the first generation 
of military field radio, telephone and telegraph 
apparatus, switching devices, communication 
cables, terrestrial signal monitoring means with 
which the Red Army entered the Great Patriotic 
War, were created [26, 61 – 73].According to 
the technical characteristics, those facilities 
primarily satisfied the requirements of that 
period, but they were not developed enough, 
because of the extremely slow pace of signal corps 
modernization. In addition, some new means of 
communication before the war were only in the 
stage of development of mass production, but for 
their mass production, there was neither capacity 
nor time. Therefore, a substantial amount of 
obsolete communication devices were used in the 
Red Army.
The problem of the supplying of Signal 
Corps with equipment was the most acute, when 
mass deployment of the Armed Forces from 
autumn 1939 started. By mid-1941, the Red 
Army increased by 280% (total number of army 
and navy reached more than 5 million people). 
By that time just central and district units of the 
Signal Corps consisted of 19 separate regiments, 
25 separate battalions and other units and 
organizations of communication. Nevertheless, 
despite the necessary amount of signal units and 
elements, the level of equipment of radio facilities 
was as follows: echelons of the General Staff- the 
front to 35%, army -corps – 11%, and divisions – 
62%, – 77 %, in battalions – 58%. From the total 
number of radio stations, obsolete types 75% was 
in the front line radio network, in the armies – 
24%, in the divisions – 89%, in the regiments – 
63% [27, D. 10, L. 271 – 273,261 – 269].
In addition to technical, there was also 
a shortage of staff, although training of 
commanders and troops of communication 
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professionals in the prewar period was performed 
in the Electrical Military Academy of the RKKA, 
Leningrad, Voronezh, Ulyanovsk, Kiev, Kharkov, 
Ordzhonikidze, Stalingrad military academies 
and military communications department of the 
Moscow institute of engineers of communication 
[23, V. 2. S, 349 – 354]. This state of affairs was 
due to an insufficient number of schools and the 
staff of teachers, as well as the problems of low 
logistic support of academic activity [28, D. 11, 
L. 33].
Such a state of military communications 
equipment and staff training on the eve of the 
war was not only due to economic hardship in the 
prewar years, but also due to in appreciation of the 
role of military communications. Thus, the Chief 
of the Red Army’s (USKA) motion on increasing 
the capacity of the communications technology 
factories was rejected, due to the fact that funds 
were necessary for increasing production of 
other kinds of military products. In addition, in 
1938 – 1939 several factories, manufacturing 
communications equipment for the army, were 
converted to the production of other weapons.
The main mistake was in the fact that the 
Soviet military leadership overestimated the role 
of nationwide communications in command and 
control of the fronts and armies’, considering that 
communication technology equipment supply 
was not so important. Thus, in the fall of 1940, the 
Defense Committee, having considered the plan 
for delivery of communications for 1941, made 
a decision to allocate most of them to various 
non-military commissariats: Railways (People’s 
Commissariat), of Internal Affairs and others 
[29. 49]. Incidentally, we see the same attitude to 
the signal corps of the Armed Forces of Russia 
nowadays.
The Army Signal Corps from April 1924 
to June 1941 was successively headed by N.M. 
Sinyavskii, R.V. Longva, A.M. Aksenov, I.A. 
Naidenov, N.I. Gapich [30. p. С 3 – 4].
The World War II analysis of many factors of 
the opposing armies fighting showed the crucial 
role of field centers in the sustainable command 
and control of troops, and also uncovered strategic 
and tactical problems. In a combat situation, 
when the enemy provides communications 
centers in the category of primary destruction 
sites, and in conditions of high troops mobility, 
the requirements for survivability and mobility 
of centers immeasurably increased. It was 
necessary to change their combat use tactics 
radically, paying particular attention to such 
issues as the deployment of elements of centers 
on the terrain, security, defense and engineering 
equipment centers, and the order of their moving. 
Nevertheless, at the beginning of the Great 
Patriotic War, these issues were worked out very 
poorly.
As before the missions of the 
communications organization at the tactical 
level (up to and including the Infantry Corps) 
were to be accomplished by the organic units 
of the Signal Corps. The main communications 
formations were: the Separate Battalion Infantry 
Corps, a separate battalion Infantry Division, 
a communication company in the regiment 
and battalion communications platoon. The 
Communication in the strategic-tactical and 
operational levels of command (Front -Army) 
was planned to be provided by forces of the 
Commissariat for Communications and Signal 
Corps Reserve Command (SRC). However, the 
full combat and communications unit of fronts 
and armies strength was only on paper, i.e. in 
the mobilization plans. Therefore, in the initial 
period of war (until Mobilization of the SRC units 
and elements) the leadership of the Red Army 
relied just on a nationwide network of People’s 
Commissariat of communication [31, p. 11].
In the first, most difficult period of war the 
lack of communications means and devices in 
border areas became apparent as did, the lack of 
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the technical equipment and poor training level of 
the troops. Stationary military communications 
centers existed in peacetime and were prepared 
for wartime, but they were not protected from air 
attack, they did not have independent outputs on 
the country lines, and therefore they were entirely 
dependent, as has been said before, on the centers 
of People’s Commissariat of communication. 
This enabled enemy aviation and saboteurs to put 
the communications centers out of action quite 
easily, according to previously planned actions. 
[32, p. 58]. Radio communications, neither 
organizationally, nor materially were not prepared 
for sustainable troop command and control. In 
the retreat, and difficult defensive battles the 
Red Army forces, units and elements were not 
fully strengthened with communications units. 
Moreover, communications units and elements 
were extremely undermanned and underequipped 
and equipment. All these and several other factors 
were a cause of control loss and temporary failure 
of our troops in the initial period of war [33, 
p. 141].
At the same time the scale of the battles 
from the outset demanded the use of the whole 
country’s capacity to ensure communications 
with the troops. In order to centralize 
communications control in the country and 
army, by the determination of the State Defense 
Committee on 23 July 1941 the Red Army’s chief 
of communications was appointed colonel I.T. 
Peresypkin (from February 1944 – Marshal of 
the Army Signal Corps), who retained the post 
of Commissar of Communication of the USSR. 
The subsequent appointment of I.T. Peresypkin as 
Deputy Commissar of Defense highly raised the 
prestige of troop leadership of communications 
departments, as that fact eliminated the inter-
departmental barriers and created the conditions 
for the use of all available resources of the 
nationwide communications network to provide 
leadership of the Armed Forces [34, p. 68 – 69].
The first week’s experience of World War II 
showed that the number of communications units, 
according to the plan, was clearly in adequate, 
mainly because of a larger-than-expected 
number of operational formations, which in 
turn increased the needs of the communications 
units and elements for every front and army. 
Therefore, the communications chief of the Red 
Army had 4 July 1941 filed a petition before the 
General Staff on the additional formation of 5 
separate regiments of communication, 33 front 
and army battalions, some linear battalion, and 
26 of the selected telegraph and construction and 
maintenance companies. The organization of the 
Red Army’s new front and army offices created 
continuously increased needs of communication 
units. In just one year of the war more than 
1000 communication units were formed. During 
particular months 250 – 350 communication 
units were in the stage of organization, i.e., a few 
dozen of the communications units per military 
district that caused considerable tension due to 
a lack of the required number of communication 
technologies in the military commands.
Since August 5, 1941 The Communications 
Office of the Red Army was reorganized into 
the Main Office of Communications, the Red 
Army (MOC), which took under their own 
control the mission of providing General Head 
Quarters and the General Staff, fronts, military 
commands, and the reserves [35, V. 3, s. 14, 28], 
since the beginning of the war the situation with 
troops technology communication providing was 
extremely complicated. Severity of the situation 
aggravated by the fact that most of electrical 
engineering factories from Leningrad, Moscow 
and Kharkov were evacuated inland, and only by 
the end of 1941 the required products began to be 
produced [36, s. 28 – 30, 37, d. 1,l. 11-12].
Particular attention was paid to the application 
and development of radio communication, which 
became much more widely used in the armed 
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forces, although by the end of the first period 
of the Great Patriotic War it was not the main 
type of communication [7. T. 2. P. 184]. It should 
be noted that in the initial period of war radio 
equipment for command and control was not 
used, because of the fear of the HQ at all levels 
being detected and the inability to deploy, to 
organize and to provide radio communication 
In order to correct that situation during of the 
summer-autumn of 1941 the People’s Commissar 
of Defense issued a decree «On the Red Army 
communication improvement» № 243 dated July 
23, 1941 [38, d. 65,l. 165 – 169], to which was later 
added a GHQ directive «About the shortcomings 
in the organization of command and control» 
of July 24, 1942 [39, s. 45]. Those documents 
ordered the elimination of underestimating radio 
communications and to create order in the use of 
radio as soon as possible.
The defensive fighting experience with 
radio communications demanded improved 
methods of its organization, modernization 
of existing and new radio facilities. Thus, in 
1942, the first portable domestic VHF A-7 with 
frequency modulation for infantry and artillery 
regiments was developed, which was much 
appreciated by the troops. Quartz-top boxes 
were set up to HF radio for radio noise-stable 
direct-printing of the General Staff to the front 
(PAT station with the prefix «Diamond»), the 
fronts to the armies (RAF station with the 
prefix «Carbide») and the army with regiments 
(radio SSR with the prefix «Bekan»). The use 
of these devices provided a significant increase 
in the stability of radio communications, in 
both the higher echelons of command, as well 
as the tactical level.
The role of radio communication increased 
greatly during the operations of the summer-
autumn campaign in 1942 [18, s. 59].
Combat experience showed that radio, 
especially while on the offensive, becomes the 
main, and often the only means of communication, 
providing command and control. Accordingly, 
further improving of the communications, 
organizational structure offorces, command and 
control functions, improving of communications 
units, and increasing of their numbers was the 
full structure of Signal corps of fronts and armies 
conducted was defined more exactly, and they 
were strengthened with new units and elements.
New elements – communications units 
of special-purpose (USON) were added to the 
General Staff communications system, through 
which a direct wired connection between 
the General HQ (Stavka) and 2-4 fronts were 
provided. USONs were placed 50-200 km behind 
the front lines. Therefore, through those units, 
communications between adjacent fronts were 
provided [40, s. 137].
In 1944 with an increased number of active 
fronts, and the distance between the General 
Staff and the fronts headquarters, the Supreme 
Command Reserve (RVGK -Reserve Verkhovnogo 
Glavnokomandovaniya) increased substantially, 
due to the new formed communications brigades 
(RVGK).
Despite all these shortcomings, the domestic 
electrical industry, reorganized during the Great 
Patriotic War according to the army needs of radio 
and wire communications means and devices was 
successful. Several models of communications 
equipment were upgraded in accordance with 
the requirements of combat units. Only in 1944, 
62 249 sets of radio stations were produced for 
Soviet troops. That was significantly higher 
than the level of 1941, when just 9586 sets were 
produced [41,20 – 21].
Besides, it should be noted that throughout 
the war the number of communications personnel 
continuously increased in the overall strength of 
the army. Thus, if on the eve of the Great Patriotic 
War signalers were about 5% of the total, by the 
end, every tenth soldier of the Red Army was 
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a signalman. During the Great Patriotic War, 
28 266 signalers were trained, in the School 
of Communications and, in the Academy of 
Communications 4 653 of command personnel 
[42, s. 241 – 243].
Gradual improvement of the organizational 
structure and technical support, methods of use, 
continuous improvement, the professional skills 
of commanders and the Army Signal Corps 
personnel special training enabled the execution 
of complex tasks to ensure forces command and 
control during the Great Patriotic War.
Mass heroism, courage and dedication were 
the main features of military signalers on the 
battlefield. 294 warriors-signalers were Heroes of 
the Soviet Union; more than 100 signalers were 
holders of the Medal of Glory. A great number 
of military communications personnel were 
awarded medals. During the war, almost 600 
communications units were awarded medals. A 
number of front and army communications units 
were awarded the title of Guards.
During World War II, the Signal Corps 
received tremendous experience in providing 
communications in difficult combat conditions.
Analyzing the Army Signal Corps 
experience, we see that success in the conduct 
of operations and fighting depended to a certain 
extent on the quality of forces command and 
control – from the state of technical equipment, 
capabilities and level of readiness and skills of 
the Army Signal Corps. Practical experience 
of communications, received in the war, and 
the equipping of signal troops with technology 
and its correct use became the foundation for 
further building and improvement of military 
communications. 
In March of 1946 the Red Army General 
Communications Office was reorganized into the 
Office of the Chief of Army Signal Corps of the 
USSR. And in April of 1948, by a directive of 
the USSR Ministry of Defense, the Office of the 
Chief of Army Signal Corps Army of the USSR 
was reorganized into the Office of the Soviet 
Army Signal Corps.
In the early postwar years, special attention 
was paid to the development and introduction of 
new principles of communications organization 
according to the great experience of the Great 
Patriotic War, that was required to improve 
the structure and quality of the Army Signal 
Corps as well as the introduction of a new army 
communications, capable of providing command 
and control in real conditions of warfare.
In 1948 the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union 
reduced to 3 million people, and major changes at 
the high level of the military command, military 
districts, armies, and divisions were carried 
out [43, 106]. The experience and views on war 
tactics were fixed in the new «Field Service 
Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR in 
1948». On the basis of Marshal I.T.Peresypkin’s 
work plan for the reorganization of security forces 
communications means, approved by the Chief 
of the General Staff, work on the acceleration 
of industrial production for the first postwar 
generation of military communications base for 
various purposes was started.
In the late 40s and 50s the signal troops 
began to receive adopted communications 
complexes with new, improved military 
characteristics: shortwave car radio sets R-100 
and F-110 for radio of the General Staff, P-101 
and F-102 to the front, P-118 and F-103 for the 
army (corps) radio networks, as well as R-104 (in 
the mobile and portable versions) for the division 
of networks and F-112 for the tank forces [44, d. 
425,l. 123 -127].
The signal troops were provided with VHF 
radio sets R-105, F-106, F-108, F-109, F-114, F-116 
and R-1 13 (Tank), which provided communication 
on preset frequencies and without fine tuning 
communication at the tactical level control [45, 
d. 105,l.10-12].
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At the same time, a fundamentally new 
type of communications – radio-relay (multi-
channel station P-400 [46, s. 34 – 38] and thin – 
route R-401 technical equipment [47, s. 30 – 40]) 
were developed for the Soviet Army, as well as 
frequency-division multiplexing and channeling 
systems (P-310, P-304, P-311, P-312, P-313, P-314), 
and improved types of telephone and telegraph 
devices, switching devices, several types of 
field communication cables were developed. 
Providing troops with relays was a completely 
new stage in the development of communication 
systems of operating units, formations and 
ground forces, so it improved reliability, 
persistence and resistance to countermeasures, 
and other characteristics.
The modernization of new equipment caused 
changes in the organizational and technical 
structure of the signal centers. Through the use of 
new means of communication standard systems 
were established for the automotive hardware 
for organizing mobile field communication hubs 
of various command levels. For the first time 
manufactured mobile communications devices 
(PUS), industrial production (during the war, 
they were made by the servicemen themselves) 
were used in the Army: PUS number 1 – for 
command post, transported by 22 cars, PUS 
number 2 – for the mobile command post of the 
front, transported by 6 cars, PUS № 3 – for the 
Army command post, transported by 9 cars, PUS 
number 4 – for Corps command posts, transported 
by 4 cars, PUS number 5 – for division command 
posts, transported by the same machine. Time for 
the deployment of those centers was significantly 
reduced, but communication systems mobility 
was greatly improved.
In October of 1958 by order of the USSR 
Ministry of Defense, the Office of Signal Corps 
of the Soviet Army was reorganized into the 
Office of the Chief Signal Corps of the Ministry 
of Defense of the USSR.
In the second half of the 50s, the rapid 
development of nuclear missiles, the improvement 
of other warfare means started, which caused 
significant changes in the Armed Forces structure. 
Thus, the new military service of the Armed 
Forces – the Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) 
was established in accordance with the Council 
of Ministers of the USSR of December 17, 1959 
[48, s. 447]. The communication units became 
integral part of SMF [48. 106]. Those structural 
and organizational changes took place in other 
services and branches of the Armed Forces. 
These circumstances, in turn, necessitated the 
development of new methods of units and 
weapons command and control.
The increased duty level greatly influenced 
the general command and control system of the 
Soviet Army and Navy and caused a significant 
time reduction in command and control 
processes.
The 60s are generally characterized by 
practical work on the automated systems of 
command and weapons (anti-aircraft, artillery and 
missile forces) development, and planning work 
in the field of troops control automation of the 
Armed Forces. That was the reason of increased 
demands on the communication systems and 
channels in terms of their stability, resistance 
to countermeasures, secrecy and transmitting 
information timing.
With the retirement in 1957, of Army Signal 
Corps Marshal I.T. Peresypkin A.I. Leonov 
took charge of the Signal Corps (from 1961 
Marshal of Signal Corps). Under his leadership, 
work on improving the structure of the Army 
Signal Corps and the creation of new means 
of communication was continued. Under his 
leadership communication devices were upgraded 
and more efficient radio devices were created.
The development and providing signal 
troops with the new HF and VHF middle and 
high average power single-sideband radio 
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devices (P-135, F-136, F-137, P-140) significantly 
enhanced the quality characteristics of radio 
channels at the operational and tactical levels 
of command. New means of VHF radio for 
tactical command level, including portable 
and Ammunition radio R-107 and R-111 with 
a wider range of frequencies (significantly 
increasing the number of operating frequencies) 
and an automatic adjustment to the prearranged 
frequency was created and [49, p. 4].
Relay communications were further 
developed. The new type of communication 
based on the P-121, F-122, F-408, F-410 enabled 
the provision of high quality multi-channel 
connections directly between the control stations 
at a distance of 150-250 km from each other 
(without relay), even through difficult terrain 
conditions.
In the 60s the first practical work on the 
creation of satellites was carried out. Complex 
were created for unified hardware compression 
and channeling for cable, radio relay and 
tropospheric communication lines, new means 
of telephone, telegraph and facsimile equipment, 
data communication equipment and information 
security systems equipment for various 
purposes.
Different types of communication equipment 
were provided and we see the development 
and delivery of next-generation hardware field 
communication hubs, as well as several types 
of command and staff vehicles for automotive 
and armored transport base for commanders 
of mechanized infantry (tank) regiments and 
battalions.
The new mobile communication 
devices highlighted the changes necessary 
in the organizational structure of the signal 
corps and in the training of highly qualified 
teams of engineering personnel and military 
communications staff, providing them with the 
necessary technical facilities. As a result, the 
whole complex of arrangements for the Signal 
Corps improvement, ensured the mobility and 
speed rate of communication in different levels 
of command.
The next stage of Signal Corps development 
is associated with the activity of A.Belov (in 1973 
Belov was conferred the rank of Marshal of the 
Signal Corps).
In the early 70s at Belov’s initiative, a system 
of routine maintenance and a field performance 
program of communication equipment was 
developed and implemented in the Army. 
This implementation improved the equipment 
maintenance culture in a quality manner, made 
possible to keep it in a state of combat readiness 
and promptly submit a complaint to the industry 
to eliminate identified equipment deficiencies.
As at that time the Soviet industry did 
not have any technical means to equip the 
communication control centers and the lack 
of an integrated extensive communications 
control system did not make it possible to 
use available channel resources effectively, 
particularly in fast-changing conditions, drastic 
measures were taken to solve the problems of 
communication system control. In this regard, 
the Central Scientific Research Institute of 
Communications of RF Ministry of Defense was 
assigned to develop and produce unconventional 
integrated equipment for the communication 
control centers. Repair services of Signal Corps 
were involved to replicate needed equipment 
and to equip communication command posts 
at the front and army level. Such advanced 
communications facilities reduced by 2-3 times 
the average time for communication gaps of the 
main signal channels.
Taking into account the increasing role of 
communication systems in the Armed Forces 
control, the Signal Corps command of the USSR 
Ministry of Defense was included in the General 
Staff as of the USSR Armed Forces. The Signal 
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Corps command existed until the beginning of 
the RF Armed Forces formation.
In the late 70s there some measures were 
taken to develop integrated researches in the 
research institutes of the Ministry of Defense 
and the Ministry of Industry, to prove conceptual 
aspects of building and operating perspective 
automated communications system of the Armed 
Forces. On the basis of the research results
Large collaboration of industrial and 
research organizations of the Ministry of Defense 
was achieved in 1980 by a special resolution 
of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of the USSR and the Council of Ministers 
of the USSR. Moreover, the joint automated 
communications network of the Armed Forces 
and communications facilities was developed.
At the same time a front automated 
communications network, unified satellite 
communication system of the Ministry of Defense 
and advanced communication facilities were 
established. The unified satellite communication 
system of the Ministry of Defense was an 
independent system and separate from the 
Ministry of Communications network had a 
common space-vehicle launching system and 
command – and – measurement complex.
The Signal Corps dealt with complicated 
problems of providing communication for 
mobile command posts (including an airborne 
communications control center) and linking them 
to the corresponding communication systems. To 
provide for the operation of the Armed Forces 
automated process-control systems, and corps 
and weapon system, the special data interchange 
systems (data communications systems) were 
developed. In its turn, the implementation of 
the automated control systems has caused an 
essential raising of requirements to technical 
characteristics of the communications equipment 
and communications system as a whole, so 
special attention was given to the development 
of new generation general communication 
equipment and the modernization of some 
existing communication equipment. As a result, 
complexes of automated frequency-adaptive 
were developed jam-resistant HV-VHV radio 
communications: for a front communications 
system -R-161; for strategic and tactical levels – 
R-164.
The analysis of the structure and the 
communication system operating conditions of 
the Soviet forces command and control at the 
operational and strategic levels in Afghanistan 
made it possible to learn some instructive lessons 
on communication organization.
From the first days of the Afghan war 
the Soviet forces had to fulfill a lot of combat 
missions. All components of the military 
command and control system were dramatically 
changed (echelons of command, command 
centers and communications system). The 
main reorganization purpose was to raise 
controllability. The combat operations 
experience demonstrated the impossibility of 
using the local communication systems centers 
and communication lines. That was caused by 
a low level of expanding communication or the 
hostile attitude of the operating staff. Difficult 
physiographical conditions required a rational 
approach to the ways of constructing field 
communication system elements, especially 
primary networks.
Space communications ranks first in the Army 
command and control system that, unfortunately, 
had been established only at the division and 
regiment levels. Wire communications was 
limited in usage because it was difficult to lay 
cable in rocky ground and to protect it.
Under preparation and in the process of 
combat operations there was a severe problem 
in providing communications security in a 
tactical command and control level. Combat 
operations illustrated the fact that in military 
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conflicts the opposing force operatively reacted 
to intercepted information practically in a real 
time scale.
During the Afghan war there were also many 
difficulties in the communication maintenance 
organization. Firstly, they were caused by a failure 
of communications equipment and the transport 
base resulting from serious battle damages, a 
sharp decrease in their technical reliability in 
difficult physiographical and environmental 
conditions, the necessity in communication 
system maintenance whose elements are dispersed 
over a large territory, etc.
The lessons received as a result of the 
experience of establishing communication 
control in Afghanistan made it possible to 
improve the ways of communication organization 
and providing communication applied to the 
conditions of conducting operations in local 
wars and conflicts and also in the conditions of 
providing forces command and control in the 
mountainous and desert areas.
In the late 80s specialists at the scientific 
research institute of the RF Ministry of Defense 
developed and implemented for the Army an 
automated complex of HF-VHF reliable radio 
communication and introduced the automated 
complex KV-UKV radio transceiver R-163 (12 
types), but in the late 90s the R-163 was replaced 
by the advanced complex of antijam radio 
communication set R-168 at the tactical level 
(17 types). Considering the combat operations 
experience in Chechnia, the complex was 
recommended as the base equipment for the 
standard communications systems at the tactical 
level.
Later, the newest multichannel radio relay 
stations (R-414, R-416, R-417, R-418, R-423) and 
low-channel radio relay stations (R-415, R-419), 
including the first home-produced RRS of 
millimetric-wave R-421, and also new effective 
tropospheric communication equipment (R-412, 
R-423) were developed to widen communications 
capabilities.
The integrated satellite communications 
system of the second stage had higher possibilities. 
To be more precise, it had high-traffic capacity 
satellites and the newest satellite communications 
stations, including light, mobile and armored 
(R-438, R-439П, R-439БК). These types of 
radio stations are more effective for providing 
communication in peacekeeping operations.
It is especially necessary to point out the 
command vehicles: the experience of Command 
Vehicle type R-145 demonstrated the fact that the 
CV’s were outmoded technically and morally. 
They were replaced by the advanced command 
post carriers with improved armor (R-149 combat 
vehicle, R-149 combat vehicle), that provide 
control and communication functions at a higher 
technical level (They include a personal computer, 
portable satellite communication station R-438, 
and navigation equipment).
The Armed Forces received the unified 
systems of frequency division multiplexing 
and time division multiplexing. In the 90s the 
complexes of field fiber-optic transmission 
systems P-335 and P-337 were developed.
Thus, it is possible to make a conclusion that the 
accepted communication equipment would allow 
the formation of highly-structured communication 
systems of strategic units. For the first time radio 
relay and tropospheric communications systems, 
sound channel and telegraph channel scramblers 
began to be widely applied in the front and army 
communication systems. Radio communication 
was arranged from all front (army) control 
centers to the control centers of the subordinate 
and coordinating units. Radio relay and wire 
communication was arranged directly or through 
auxiliary communication centers or main signal 
centers. Difficult work was carried out to establish 
multipurpose stationary territorial communication 
systems of military districts and to improve the 
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national communication network, to increase its 
survivability and qualitative characteristics of 
communication channels, where the basic control 
and communications systems of the Joint Staff, 
military branches and the special control systems of 
the Ministry of Defense are based on the channels 
of this communication system. The questions 
of Signal Corps organization and establishment 
improvement, Signal Corps development and 
qualified signal specialist training were decided 
timely.
During a long period of Signal Corps 
leadership (1970 – 1987) Marshal Belov managed 
to reorganize the Signal Corps radically to a 
symmetrical system which allowed the Command 
to deliver decisions and orders in real time to 
the armed forces and to provide continuous, 
operations and sustained control for the Armed 
forces. After Marshal Belov the Signal Corps 
were commanded and controlled by General 
K.I. Kobets (1987-1990), General O.S.  Lisovskij 
(1990-1991), General G.P. Gichkin (1991-1997), 
General Yu.M. Zalogin (1997-2003), General N.P. 
Ljaskalo (2003-2005).
During the last decade of the 20th century 
there were many global changes in politics, 
economy and society that affected the world. 
Socialism and the USSR collapsed, the Warsaw 
Pact was liquidated.
The protracted stage of the Russian 
Federation’s formation and the process of 
Armed Forces reorganization heavily affected 
the Signal Corps in the Armed Forces. As a 
result, the numerical strength of the Signal 
Corps was considerably reduced. The lack of 
sufficient financing led to a critical situation 
where the number of communications equipment 
considerably decreased and providing the Army 
with the newest communication equipment was 
practically stopped.
Moreover, the situation was aggravated 
by the fact that the Signal Corps command was 
unable to quantity estimate the current situation, 
to define the developmental priorities of the 
communication system and the Signal Corps as 
a whole.
The main purpose of the plans concerning 
the communication system and the Signal Corps, 
the Government arms program for 2001-2010 
(concerning the communication system and the 
Signal Corps) was to develop a technological 
basis of the communication control system 
through the introduction of innovations and 
technologies of the 70s and the 80-ies of the XX 
century. For these reasons, the Signal Corps of the 
Armed Forces began to degradate. By 2005, the 
state of the communications system was deemed 
unsatisfactory.
In 2005, the Armed Forces of the Russian 
Federation was headed by Colonel-General E.A. 
Karpov .
The office of the Chief Signal Officer analyzed 
in detail the real state of the communication 
system and the Signal Corps of the Armed Forces 
and came to conclusion. To improve the following 
situation the office of the Chief Signal Officer 
developed a number of program documents 
signed by the Minister of Defense and the Chief 
of the General Staff:
“The concept of transitioning the Armed • 
forces communication system to digital 
telecommunication equipment”;
“The special integrated work program • 
of a phased transition from a primary 
communications network of the RF Armed 
forces to digital telecommunications 
equipment”;
“The program of a phased transition from • 
secondary communication networks of the 
Armed forces of the Russian Federation 
to digital data processing equipment and 
service provisioning”.
These programs were aimed at 
communications system modernization, a 
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planned re-equipment of the forces with the latest 
communications equipment that were developed 
by using modern telecommunications and 
information technologies.
The development of the following programs 
was an objective necessity considering the 
general tendencies of communication systems 
development in the Russian Federation.
Many operators deploy and operate digital 
and communications systems successfully, and 
provide users with a variety of telecommunications 
services. It is obvious that the Armed Forces 
communication system being a special consumer 
of communications services of an Integrated 
telecommunications network in Russia follows 
all progress changes.
The implementation of advanced 
telecommunication technologies will make 
it possible to establish an unified automated 
communication system of the Armed Forces that 
will provide the various communication services 
to the military command authority and officials 
and will allow the automation all processes 
of troop command and control and weapons 
control.
It should be noted that the experience of 
developing a similar system in the Soviet Union 
proves the fact that the successful accomplishment 
of a mission to establish an integrated automated 
digital communication system of the Armed 
Forces can be provided only in conditions of a 
due attention from the country’s leadership and a 
full funding for its deployment.
Now, as well as in the time of the Integrated 
automated communication system development 
by the USSR Armed forces, the forms and 
methods of conducting armed conflicts were 
also reconsidered. The industry enterprises 
were reconstructed under the influence of 
other (market) factors. the new technologies 
appeared. But one essential difference is the fact 
that the Armed Forces Integrated Automated 
Communication System was established in the 
time of economic recession and the USSR’s 
collapse. The IACS reconstruction work begins 
in the period of the state and economy’s rebirth 
that allows us to expect the successful realization 
of this perspective system.
Today, in the process of forming a new-
look Armed Forces, the Signal Corps are being 
developed in difficult conditions of planned 
transformation of the communication system and 
the Signal Corps in a direction of the maximal 
conformity of technical characteristics in the 
control system and the structure of the Armed 
forces both in peacetime, and in wartime, taking 
into account many factors of a political, economic, 
scientific, technical and military nature. The 
decisions concerning the Armed Forces new 
look and optimization affect the attitude to the 
Army control elements: communication system, 
the Signal Corps, communication equipment 
development, military education, etc.
The Armed Forces informatization process 
requires a reforming of the means of conducting 
combat operations and providing information 
support in battle.
So, at the present time the leading countries 
establish global information networks for military 
use on the base of developing communication 
systems. Such systems, constructed with the use of 
internet technologies, will be provided with a high 
information throughput, scalability and external 
influence resistance. Seeing these principles the 
organization, missions and especially equipment 
of the communications system and the main 
development prospects require drastic changes 
and quick re-equipment.
The new hazards and risks to the security of 
the Russian Federation, the optimization of the 
Armed Forces structure determine a necessity for 
the forces control structure development, forms 
of adaptation and methods of application in the 
present time.
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The general purpose of the communication 
system establishment and development being 
the infrastructure element of the Armed Forces 
command and control system is a transition 
from the old system to the newest form of the 
communication network organization by means 
of digitalization and their integration to the 
integrated information space of the Army.
Nowadays, the Office of the Chief Signal 
Officer of the Russian Federation Armed Forces 
is developing an establishment concept of 
integrated information space of the Army that 
should promote effective forces employment by 
organization of timely planning and coordination 
of their operations, providing timely feedback 
communications with the subordinated forces, 
units and detachments to receive information 
concerning their status, position and facilities 
promoting an accomplishment of assigned 
missions.
The only hope is that in the near future 
the planned perspective work on Signal Corps 
development will equalize the Army technical 
level in a quantity manner with the level of the 
USA at the beginning of the new millenium. In 
the US Armed Forces provision with individual 
radio communication facilities is still at the top 
level, particularly, their organizational structure 
of communication units.
In August of 2008, the Russian Armed 
Forces met some problems in providing 
communications for the operating forces being 
involved in the military conflict of Georgia 
with Abkhazia and the Southern Ossetia. This 
situation was like the military operations of 
1941, when tanks and airplanes were engaged 
in military operations without communications 
facilities. Although the Armed Forces of the 
Russian Federation are equipped with up-to-date 
weaponry it is impossible to conduct military 
operations without modern communications 
means.
Unfortunately, there is one more negative 
tendency in the Russian Armed forces. 
Likeprewar years, all Russian departments 
were provided with communication, except 
the Armed forces; this was already noted in 
the article. These days the level of providing 
communications for the internal security troops 
of the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian 
Federation is notably higher than the level in the 
Ministry of Defense.
The beginning of the XXI century is an 
appropriate time to solve a problem of providing 
the Russian Army with modern communications 
equipment satisfying all requirements.
It is essential to emphasize the fact that in 
conditions of modern warfare and large-scale 
military conflicts the Armed Forces will be pressed 
in time to produce and install communication 
equipment following the experience of the Great 
Patriotic War. That we must all remember.
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История, современное состояние и перспективы развития  
военной связи в Российской Федерации
В.И. Голиков
Томский государственный университет 
Россия 634045, г. Томск, ул. Ф. Лыткина, 11
В статье рассматривается исторический путь развития военной связи в России от времени 
ее зарождения до наших дней, показаны противоречия между состоянием военной связи в 
системе управления войсками и характером современных военных действий, основные 
направления развития войск связи в условиях формирования нового облика Вооруженных Сил 
Российской Федерации.
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